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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN, 
Appellant. 
v. 
GUENTHER JACOBSEN 
Appellee. 
Appeal No.: 20080802-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
In his Brief of Appellee, Guenther argues "several areas" of Veronica's Opening Brief 
are not in compliance with UT. R. APP. P. 24 and 27. Brief of Appellee at p. 11-12. Guenther is 
mistaken in this argument. Guenther argues that the Statement of the Case and Fact 
sections, cover, and typeface in the Opening Brief fail to comply with UT. R. APP. P. 24 and 
27. Id. at p. 12. Guenther argues Veronica was allowed five (5) days to correct these errors 
pursuant to UT. R. APP. P. 27(e), but did not do so. Id. Guenther, however, indicates he has 
no objection to this Court's discretion in accepting the Opening Brief to avoid any further 
delay, although the heading of his argument reads, "[t|he clerical errors in the brief of 
appellant may be so egregious as to warrant sanctions." Id. at pp. 11-12. Since the Opening 
Brief has been accepted by this Court, Guenther's contention on this issue is incorrect and, 
given his concession, is moot. 
A. Guenther Failed to Adequately Brief His Request for Sanctions. 
UT. R. APP. P. 33 governs recoupment for damages and costs associated with either 
delay or a frivolous appeal, indicating as follows: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a 
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorneys 
fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the 
party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief or 
other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
An appeal, motion, brief or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one 
interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. 
A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion 
for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part 
of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to 
the party or the party's attorney or both an crder to show cause why such 
damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the 
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in 
which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The order to 
show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall 
grant a hearing. 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 33 set forth that this rule is in keeping with UT. R. 
ClV. P. 11, with the rule making express "the authority of the court to impose sanctions 
upon the party or upon counsel for the party." Ibid. 
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As mentioned, Guenther's brief contains an argument heading that reads, "[t]he 
clerical errors in the brief of appellant may be so egregious as to warrant sanctions." Id. at 
pp. 11-12. Guenther cites only to what he perceives to be as clerical errors in Veronica's 
opening brief, failing to cite to Rule 33 altogether, and failing to further explain how clerical 
errors would support a finding of sanctions on appeal. Rule 33 clearly indicates that 
sanctions on appeal are found only upon the filing of a frivolous appeal, which is specifically 
defined as "not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." UT. R. APP. P. 33(b). While these 
grounds can be raised as part of the appellee brief under Rule 33(c)(1), Guenther did not 
argue any of these grounds in his appellee brief and, in fact, could not. Veronica's brief is 
clearly grounded in fact, warranted by the slew of existing case law cited therein, and 
contains several arguments brought in good faith to extend, modify or reverse existing law. 
Guenther's argument is without merit and inadequately briefed. See, Ball v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n (In re Questar Gas Co.). 2007 UT 79, % 40, 175 P.3d 545 (ccWe have consistently 
declined to review issues that are not adequately briefed.") 
The Opening Brief complies with UT. R. APP. P. 24 and 27. Veronica reserved the 
Statement of Fact section so as to avoid repetition of the facts throughout the brief, 
particularly given the marshaling of the evidence required for some of the issues. Veronica's 
brief is also in garamond font si2e 13, which is in compliance with UT. R. APP. P. 27(b). 
Furthermore, UT. R. APP. P. 27(e) rule states as follows: 
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing. If they are not prepared in accordance 
with these rules, they will not be filed but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
The clerk shall retain one copy of the non-complying brief and the party shall file a 
brief prepared in compliance with these rules within 5 days. The party whose brief 
has been rejected under this provision shall immediately notify the opposing party in 
3 
writing of the lodging. The clerk may grant additional time for bringing a brief into 
compliance only under extraordinary circumstances. This rule is not intended to 
permit significant substantive changes in briefs. 
Guenther cannot rely upon Rule 27(e) since whether to accept or reject the brief 
under such rule is at the discretion of this Court and its clerks. When the five (5) day 
correction period is implemented under Rule 27(e), an appellant is immediately notified and 
this Court lodges the brief. In the instant case, the clerk examined the Opening Brief filed in 
person, determined it to be prepared in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure, and 
stamped it as properly filed. The Opening Brief has never been returned to Veronica by this 
Court based on non-compliance with UT. R. APP. P. 27(1)), and it is not an appropriate issue 
to be raised by an appellee during briefing since it is procedural in nature and discretionary 
with this Court. 
Furthermore, Guenther did not object to the filing of the brief after having received 
his copies of it, thus waiving any argument based on these alleged errors. Since he concedes 
to such challenge in his brief, it is clearly without merit and appears only to serve as a 
distraction for this Court from the meritorious issues. 
II. V E R O N I C A HAS C H A L L E N G E D T H E TRIAL COURT'S 
C O N C L U S I O N OF LAW P E R T A I N I N G T O T H E 
E N F O R C E A B I L I T Y OF T H E DIVORCE A G R E E M E N T , W H I C H 
C H A L L E N G E D O E S N O T R E Q U I R E MARSHALING OF T H E 
E V I D E N C E ; ALTERNATIVELY, V E R O N I C A PROPERLY 
MARSHALED T H E E V I D E N C E . 
In his Brief of Appellee, Guenther argues Veronica has failed to marshal the evidence as 
it pertains to the Divorce Agreement. Brief of Appellee at pp. 13-17. Veronica was not 
required to marshal the evidence with respect to her challenges on appeal. Those challenges 
were based in the trial court's application of the law to the facts, or a challenge to the 
4 
conclusions of law rendered by the trial court. Alternatively, if there exists an "extremely 
fact-sensitive" or "fact-dependent" conclusion that warrants application of the marshaling 
doctrine, Veronica met such burden by recitation of all pertinent facts and evidence 
pertaining thereto. 
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states in pertinent part that, "[a] party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
(Emphasis added). "We determine the existence of a contract . . .by resorting to principles 
of law; therefore, we grant no deference to the trial court that originally decided the matter." 
Carter v. Sorenson. 2004 UT 33, &6, 90 P.3d 637; see, Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc., 
1999 UT 100, &17, 989 P.2d 1077. "Whether a contract exists between parties is a 
question of law; therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion of law under a correction 
of error standard." Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v. Quintek 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 
1992)(emphasis added), citing Bailey v. Call 767 P.21d 138, 139 (Utah App), cert denied, 113 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); accord, Scarf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985). 
In Kimball v. Kimball this Court recendy revisited the marshaling requirement and 
determined the following concerning its prior holdings on the subject: 
...[T]he marshaling doctrine, now recognized in our rules, see UTAH R.APP. P. 
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding."), requires that counsel identify which particular 
findings are challenged as lacking adequate evidentiary support and then show the 
court why that is so. This can only logically be done by summarizing, or 
"marshaling," whatever evidence there is that supports each challenged finding. We 
emphasize that only the supportive evidence is legally relevant and is all that counsel 
should call our attention to. See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 12, 51 P.3d 724 
("[A]n exhaustive or voluminous recitation of all the facts presented at trial, even if 
this recitation includes within its body the facts that support the challenged ruling, is 
not what is expected."), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
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Ibid., 2009 UT App. 233, fn. 5, 217 P.3d 733. Hence, this Court clarified that, "[i]f there is 
some supportive evidence, once that evidence is marshaled it is the challenger's burden to 
show the 'fatal flaw' in that supportive evidence... and explain why the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding." Id. citing West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991). This Court has referred to the marshaling doctrine as 
playing the "devil's advocate," which requires an appellant to "present the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable 
to their case." Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham. 2008 UT App. 207, ^[12, 186 
P.3d 1012, citing Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, f78, 100 P.3d 1177. Furthermore, an attack of 
a finding on appeal bars a party from merely rearguing the evidence supporting their position 
below. Kimball at ^[22. 
A very narrow exception exists in applying the marshaling requirement when a "legal 
standard is extremely fact-sensitive." See, Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. ComtroL Inc.. 2007 
UT App ^[44, 175 P.3d 572 (conclusions were reliant on trial court's specific findings of fact 
related to the actual language in subcontract agreements, hence challenge to conclusions of 
law required marshaling), citing Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, % 76, 100 P.3d 1177 (ccWhere a 
trial court's rulings on highly fact-dependent issues are challenged, this court grants a 
broader than normal discretion to the trial court" and "appellant has a duty to marshal"). 
Veronica's challenge pertains to the trial court's determination of the enforceability of 
the Divorce Agreement, as to whether it existed as a contract between the parties to this 
appeal. This challenge is clearly a conclusion of law and therefore does not require 
marshaling of the evidence. See, Chase v. Scott. 2001 UT App. 404, 38 P.3d 1001 ("We 
accord the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the contract no deference and review 
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them for correctness."). Guenther has neither challenged Veronica's issues as meeting the 
narrow exception to the marshaling requirement implicated in conclusions of law challenges, 
nor has he adequately briefed his position that such challenge is fact-dependent or fact-
sensitive. See, Traco and Chen, supra. Guenther's failure to brief such issue is likely based on 
the fact that this matter does not meet such exception, as evidenced by the standard of 
review governing this Court on whether a contract exists. Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc.. supra. 
When determining whether a contract exists between the parties, this Court "resorts 
to principles of law" and "grantfs] no deference to the trial court that originally decided the 
matter." Carter at ^|6, supra. '"Whether a contract exists between parties is a question of law; 
therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion of law under a correction of error standard." 
Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. at 583 (additional citations omitted). Cases in which the courts 
have applied the "some discretion" standard of review of fact-dependent challenges include 
breach of fiduciary duty (C&Y Corp v. General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47, fn. 7 (Utah 
App. 1995)); waiver (State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994)); materiality determination 
an re Estate of Beesley. 883 P.2d 1343, 1347-48 (Utah 1994)); entrapment (State v. J.D.W.. 
259 Utah Adv.Rep. 22, 23, - P.2d - (Utah App 1995)); effect of incorrect testimony (State v. 
Gordon. 886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 1994)); equitable estoppels (Trolley Square Assocs. 
V. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994)); custody (State v. Teuscher. 883 P.2d 922, 
929 (Utah App. 1994)); and good faith and fair dealing (Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door 
Corp.. 993 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994)). While this Court has previously determined 
that a question of meeting of the minds on a contract creates a factual issue, such issue must 
be specifically addressed below to enable review by this Court; otherwise, remand is 
7 
appropriate for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. See, Migliore v. Migliore. 2008 UT App 
208^22,186 P.3d 973. 
In the instant matter, the trial court did not specifically address the question of a 
"meeting of the minds" with respect to the Divorce Agreement. Instead the court 
determined the issue based upon Veronica having drafted it, the parties having signed it, and 
the partial performance of some of its provisions. Veronica challenged the application of 
these facts to the trial court's conclusion that the Divorce Agreement was a valid and 
binding contract between the parties, arguing that nei her of the parties intended to be 
bound by its contents. The trial court presumptively made the determination of a "meeting 
of the minds" without entering findings specific to sucb matter. Hence, remand would be 
requisite should this Court find that it was a fact-depe ident challenge since the facts are 
lacking on the record to render an adequate determination. Migliore. supra. 
Should this Court determine Veronica was required to marshal the evidence 
presented on the issue, it is clear by mere review of the opening brief in this matter that 
Veronica did meet the requirement. Guenther argues Veronica was required to "present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. ' Appellee Brief at p. 13. However, 
Guenther makes only broad blanket assertions that Veronica has failed to do so, failing 
entirely to adequately set forth evidence Veronica "ignored" in her challenge to the 
conclusions of law. 
"The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that an appellate court is not required to address 
the merits ... if [a] ... brief contains unfounded accusations impugning the integrity of the 
court." See Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, f l , 151 P.3d 962. In 
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these situations, the brief may be stricken and the appellate court may decline to consider the 
appeal as a sanction for violations of rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." 
Brynerv. Bryner 2008 WL 2544897. 
In the instant case, Guenther lists a myriad of evidence he argues Veronica failed to 
marshal. Appellee Brief at pp. 14-17. However, the sparse bits of evidence he claims were 
overlooked were actually marshaled and set forth in Veronica's Opening Brief. x See, Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 16-20. The Opening Brief argues that the fatal flaw in the trial court's 
determination of the enforceability of the Divorce Agreement lies in the bad faith 
negotiation of the contract and the unreasonable constraint upon the trial court's equitable 
and statutory duties. Briefof* Appellant at p. 20. Furthermore, as the parties held themselves 
out to be husband and wife after the Divorce Agreement was signed, it seems that such 
agreement would be rendered moot. See Brief of Appellant at p. 17. 
Guenther argues that Veronica did not marshal the evidence pertaining to the 
ambiguity of the Divorce Agreement. Brief of Appellee at pp. 15-17. Guenther mistakenly 
views Veronica's challenge to this issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; 
however, Veronica's challenge is clearly to the trial court's applications of law. Guenther's 
confusion on this issue is obvious, as he states, "Guenther is unsure as to why Veronica 
included this as judicial error requiring correction by this Court." Id. at p. 16. Veronica has 
plainly argued the Divorce Agreement was ambiguous since the trial court concluded any 
ambiguities would be construed against Veronica as the drafter, as argued more particularly 
supra. Marshaling on this issue was not required; however, if it is determined by this Court 
Among other claims, this Court should particularly note Guenther claims Veronica failed to cite to her testimony the 
Divorce Agreement was to keep Guenther from "taking off," but such citation is in fact included in her Opening Brief. 
See, Brief of Appellant 2X pp. 15-16. 
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that Veronica was required to and sufficiently matshaled the evidence and further 
demonstrated the trial court's error in its failure to apply t he law correcdy. 
Guenther also fails to accurately cite to the evidence. Guenther claims Veronica failed 
to indicate that she drafted the Divorce Agreement and that it was her idea; however, such 
citation is mentioned in her opening brief. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 15; Brief of Appellant at pp. 
15-18, and 24. In fact, Guenther's review of the record supports Veronica's version of 
events concerning the ambiguity of the Divorce Agreement: Veronica drafted the Divorce 
Agreement and changes were made by the parties mutually. Brief of Appellee at pp. 15-16. 
While Guenther is correct that the trial court did not find the Divorce Agreement to be 
ambiguous, he neglects the trial court's determination to construe any ambiguity against 
Veronica as the drafter. See, Brief of Appellant at p. 23; Exhibit "A" at p. 2. 
Summarily, Guenther has failed in his challenge that Veronica has failed to marshal 
the evidence. The Opening Brief sufficiently marshals the evidence, and Veronica's claims 
are valid and meritorious. The Opening Brief more than adequately summarizes and sets 
forth the supportive evidence, demonstrating the fatal flaws in the trial court's factual 
application to the law. Furthermore, unlike Guenther's assertion, Veronica is not required to 
make an exhaustive or voluminous recitation of all the facts presented at trial. Id. Veronica 
met the marshaling requirement rather than merely rearguing her position below to this 
Court. Burton at ^12 and Kimball at ^22. Accordingly, Guenther's multiple claims that 
Veronica has failed to marshal the evidence fall short. 
III. UNDER GUENTHER'S THEORY OF THE CASE PERTAINING TO 
STIPULATIONS, VERONICA HAS EVIDENCED THAT A 
"MANIFEST INJUSTICE" OCCURRED WARRANTING 
NONRELIANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE DIVORCE 
AGREEMENT FOR ITS DETERMINATION. 
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In the little legal authority cited to by Guenther, he argues that the facts of this case 
are similar to that of Jensen v. Jensen, wherein this Court determined the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion to set aside a stipulation made on the record by the parties concerning the 
sale of their Murray home. Ibid., 2008 UT App. 392, ^[24, 197 P.3d 117. However, such case 
is easily differentiated, since Veronica and Guenther entered into the Divorce Agreement 
independent of the trial court, at a distance from any legal proceedings, and without the 
intent that it be utilized in legal proceedings. Furthermore, the law applicable to stipulations 
versus that applicable to contracts differs gready.2 However, since Guenther believes the 
matter to be more analogous to stipulations, then Veronica must simply meet the standard 
of "manifest injustice" to show that the trial court should not have relied upon the Divorce 
Agreement in its determination in this matter. See, Morrison, at fn. 2 supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously defined the term "manifest injustice" by 
stating that it "is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard expressly provided in Utah Rule 
of Evidence 103(d) and elaborated upon in [State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)]." 
"Stipulations are entered into in order to dispense with proof over matters not in issue, thereby promoting judicial 
economy at the convenience of the parties." United States v. McGregor. 529 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1976), citing 9 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2588-2597 (3d ed. 1940). Our Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that, "Stipulations 
cannot be disregarded or set aside at will, but are not absolute and will be set aside to prevent manifest injustice." 
Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Ground Improvement Techniques. Inc.. 532 F. 3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008)(emphasis added). 
Conversely, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[c]ontracts define the legal obligations of the parties, and 
thus, when enforceable, set the boundaries within which the district court's equitable discretion must operate." 
Ashby v. Ashby. 2010 UT 7, ^| 34, — P.3d — (emphasis added). In contract law, the general rule is that "the law favors 
the right of men of full age and competent understanding to contract freely." Ockey v. Lehmer. 2008 UT 37, ^[21, 189 
P.3d 51 citing Frailey v. McGarry. 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840, 847 (1949); see also Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson. 
2000 UT 64, ^|15, 8 P.3d 256 ("[Pjeople are generally free to bind themselves pursuant to am contract, barring such 
things as illegality of subject matter or legal incapacity."). The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] contract functions in 
part to apportion risk of future events between the contracting parties. Moreover, parties are free to allocate the risk of 
future events between them however they wish." Deep Creek Ranch. LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd.. 2008 UT 3, ^ [19, 
178 P.3d 886. This Court has held, u[t]he law even permits parties to enter into unreasonable contracts or contracts 
leading to a hardship on one party.'" Glacier Land Co.. L.L.C v. Claudia Klawe & Associates. L.L.C.. 2006 UT App. 
516, T[21,154 P.3d 852 citing Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores. Inc.. 972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998). 
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State v. Casey. 2003 UT 55, 1}40, 82 P.3d 1106, citing State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121-122 
(Utah I989)(citing Eldredge). The two-pronged "plain enror" test requires that the error be 
"plain" or "manifest," which is sometimes termed the "obviousness requirement." Id., citing 
Verde. The second prong is that "the error be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the 
substantial rights of a party." Id., citing Verde at 122. 
'Where a court has felt it necessary to prevent sn injustice, particularly where facts 
contrary to the stipulation are established by evidence, the court may relieve a party from a 
stipulation." U.S. v. Kulp. 365 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In the matter of Sinnock v. 
Young 142 P.2d 85 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1943), the court indicated that, where the trial 
evidence was introduced conclusively showing that certain facts set forth therein were 
incorrect and untrue, there arose a duty upon the court to relieve the party adversely affected 
from the stipulation. 
In order successfully to attack a stipulation designed to settle the facts of a 
case and submitted for the purpose of enabling the court to determine the 
controversy, it is necessary that the party should show the particulars of a 
claim that it has omitted material facts, and the reasons therefor, as well as to 
substantiate through other methods than allegmg a mere conclusion the 
position that it was signed upon inadequate information, or that some 
misrepresentation was made whereby a false or incomplete representation of 
the case was incorporated into the stipulation. 
161 A.L.R. 1161 citing Robinson v. Oregon City Sand & Gravel Co. (1933) 143 Or 177, 20 
P2d 1073. 
Veronica clearly met the criteria for setting aside the Divorce Agreement should this 
Court determine that such law pertaining to stipulations is applicable, as Guenther has 
indicated in his responsive brief. The Divorce Agreement was either negotiated in bad faith 
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or unreasonably constrained the trial court's equitable and statutory duties. Sweet v. Sweet 
2006 UT App. 216, p , 138 P.3d 63. The parties, particularly Guenther, did not exercise 
good faith, honesty, and candor in negotiating the Divorce Agreement. Neither party was 
actually contemplating divorce when the Divorce Agreement was signed, which is evidenced 
by the record. Veronica did not see a divorce lawyer after signing the Divorce Agreement 
and was unaware whether Guenther had seen a lawyer. R0393 at p. 31. Veronica did not 
intend to divorce Guenther at the time she signed the Divorce Agreement. Id. Upon signing 
the Divorce Agreement, Guenther was not contemplating divorce and did not move in that 
direction. R0393 at p. 198. In fact, Veronica's testimony was that her underlying reason for 
the Divorce Agreement was to simply threaten divorce and, after doing so, Guenther treated 
her better. See, R0393 at p. 32. Since the parties, upon signing the Divorce Agreement, did 
not intend to divorce, the parties did not mutually assent their intent to be bound by the 
terms of the Divorce Agreement. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 
1962). 
Clearly, "some misrepresentation was made whereby a false or incomplete 
representation of the case was incorporated into the stipulation" in this matter. See, 161 
A.L.R. 1161, citing Robinson. 20 P.2d 1073. Additionally, as indicated supra, facts contrary to 
the stipulation were established by evidence at trial in this matter. Kulg, supra. It was plain 
error for the trial court to have relied upon the contents of an agreement that the parties 
never intended to enforce. Thus, the trial court should have relieved the parties from the 
Divorce Agreement, and its reliance thereon has worked a manifest injustice against 
Veronica in this matter. 
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IV. SHOULD THE EXISTENCE OF THE DIVORCE AGREEMENT 
BE AFFIRMED, THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE WAS IN ERROR. 
Guenther challenges the preservation of the issue concerning Veronica's claim that 
she bartered away her alimony for equity interest in the Terra Vista Home. Brief of Appellee 
p. 17. Guenther further alludes that Veronica may have breached the Divorce Agreement 
because she did not make required payments towards the Terra Vista mortgage after August 
of 2004. Brief of Appellee at p. 22. However, Guenther has again failed to comprehend 
Veronica's position on this issue, which is plainly set forth by the Opening Brief. See, Brief of 
Appellants pp. 24-29. 
This Court has held, "[i]t is [a] court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the plain language of the covenants." Holladay Duplex Management Co., 
L.L.C. v. Howells. 2002 UT App 125, ]f7, 47 P.3d 104, citing Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT 
16, Tfll, 998 P.2d 807. Furthermore, [s]uch language is to be taken in its ordinary and 
generally understood and popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement 
nor the words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon." 
Id., citing Freeman v. Gee. 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155, 163 (1967). This Court has found, 
"[i]f the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, then a court does 
not resort to extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and a court determines the parties' 
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law." Young v. 
Wardley Corp.. 2008 UT App. 104, ]|9, 182 P.3d citing Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel 
Inc.. 2002 UT 62, ^16, 52 P.3d 1179. The parties' intentions are controlling. State v. Ison. 
2006 UT 26,1J46, 135 P.3d 864 citing Bakowski at fL6. Thus, "[t]he trial court is to consider 
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"[e]ach contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view to giving effect to all 
and ignoring none. '" Young at ^[10 citing Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). This Court has previously determined, "[t]he rule 
is well setded that a person cannot recover back money which he has voluntarily paid with 
full knowledge of all of the facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion in some form." 
Southern Tide Guar. Co.. Inc. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App 1988), citing 66 
Amjur.2d destitution and Implied Contracts f 93 (1973). The Utah Supreme Court has found as 
follows: 
We have previously held that a trial court must consider many factors in 
making a property setdement in a divorce proceeding, but that the purpose of 
the setdement should not be to impose punishment on either party. Although 
the court ruled that "marital misconduct . . . should be considered in making 
an equitable division of property," it does not necessarily follow that the 
defendant was in fact in any way punished by the ultimate division made of 
the property. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah, 1980), citing Read v. Read. 594 P.2d 871 
(1979). 
Contract law is clear that a party cannot expect to be placed in a better position than 
it agreed to be under the contract. See, Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co.. Inc.. 912 P.2d 
457, 462 (Utah App. 1996). This Court has held the following: 
It is fundamental that every contract imposes a duty on the parties to exercise 
their contractual rights and perform their contractual obligations reasonably 
and in good faith. See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 
(Utah 1982); Rio Algom Corp., 618 P.2d at 505. Nonetheless, a court may not 
make a better contract for the parties than they have made for 
themselves furthermore, a court may not enforce asserted rights not 
supported by the contract itself See Rio Algom Corp., 618 P.2d at 505. "|I]t 
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cannot be adopted as a general precept of contract law that, whenever one 
party to a contract can show injury flowing from the exercise of a contract 
right by the other, a basis for relief will be someaow devised by the courts." 
Mann, 586 P.2d at 464. 
Ted R. Brown and Associates. Inc. v. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964, 970-971 (Utah App. 
1988)(emphasis added). 
Through its reliance upon the Divorce Agreement due to what it perceived to be 
partial performance, the trial court has in essence created provisions outside the plain 
language contained within that contract. By doing so, it has created a contract that favors 
Guenther in the divorce rather than focusing on the equitable nature of the case. The trial 
court's enforcement of the contract exceeded the terms contained therein to Veronica's 
detriment. 
The Divorce Agreement provided at its core that Veronica's name was to be taken 
off the loans for the Terra Vista property, but that her name would remain on the title. 
Then at some point in the future (after August 31, 2004), the property would be sold and 
Veronica would receive the equity "divided equally," or in any event no less than $70,000.00. 
(Exhibit B, Trial Exhibit P-4). Under this contract, any payments made by Guenther to the 
loans on the property prior to its sale involved making payments to Veronica without regard 
to offset. Any other interpretation renders the Veronica's benefits under the contract 
illusory—she bargained for a situation where she would have no responsibility for any debt 
payments on the property, but she would still have full ownership in the property. Under 
3.1 of the Divorce Agreement, it says "Equity will be divided equally . . ." (Exhibit B, 
emphasis added). She waived her right to alimony under the Divorce Agreement for an 
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equal share of any equity which accrued in the Terra Vista property, including an equal share 
of any payments Guenther made to the Terra Vista property. She is entided to the benefit 
of her bargain. 
As to Guenther's position that Veronica breached the Divorce Agreement, such issue 
is either not properly before this Court or not properly briefed by Guenther. "One cannot 
prove a breach of contract claim without proving the actual existence of a contract..." Moss 
v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. 2008 UT App 405, f l7 , 197 P.3d 659. "The 
elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by 
the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." 
Bair v. Axiom Design. LLC. 2001 UT 20, ^[14, 20 P.3d 388. Guenther neither sets forth the 
factors for breach of the Divorce Agreement nor adequately briefs such issue under UT. R. 
APP. P. 24. Regardless, Guenther did not raise a cross-appeal in this matter on grounds of 
breach and is thus barred from raising them in his appellee's brief herein. UT. R. APP. P. 
4(d). 
Guenther erroneously attempts to do that which this Court has previously indicated 
as inappropriate. "[I]t cannot be adopted as a general precept of contract law that, whenever 
one party to a contract can show injury flowing from the exercise of a contract right by the 
other, a basis for relief will be somehow devised by the courts." Ted R. Brown at 970-971, 
citing Mann. 586 P.2d at 464. It was not within the trial court's authority to devise relief in 
favor of Guenther under the Divorce Agreement if it determined that such agreement was 
binding on the parties, since to do so is contrary to an individual's right to rely on the 
provisions under which they contract. Veronica relied on the provisions of the Divorce 
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Agreement and her equitable share of the proceeds from sale of the Terra Vista home to 
waive her right to alimony. The trial court gave her neither, then erroneously created 
contractual provisions placing Guenther in a better position than that which he contracted, 
all to Veronica's detriment. Veronica is not barred from raising issues that could not have 
reasonably been foreseen in the trial court's conclusions respecting interpretation of the 
Divorce Agreement. Additionally, Guenther's challenge that Veronica's breach supports the 
trial court's decision was not properly briefed nor is it properly before this Court in this 
matter. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT IS BOUND BY THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES. 
In his Brief of Appellee, Guenther argues Veronica lacks supportive caselaw for her 
issue that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing property at a price not submitted to 
it by the evidence. Brief of Appellee at p. 24. However, it is basic knowledge that a court 
cannot affix a value to property without some basis for its determination of value or make 
findings as to its arrival to its determination. 
This Court has determined a party must provide evidence for a trial court to assess 
valuation. Sather v. Pitcher. 748 P.2d 191, 193-194 ^Utah App.,1987). In the case of 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's division of equity 
in the marital home. Ibid., 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah,1987). The wife in that matter had invested 
money from her inheritances in the marital home and was awarded the amount she invested, 
which was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. Id at 1278. The husband also claimed error 
in the trial court's determination of the current market value of the marital home, which the 
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trial court determined to be the middle ground between the two (2) experts that testified at 
trial. Id. The Utah Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as 
the determination was supported by findings. 
In the matter of Berger v. Berger. the Utah Supreme Court determined a trial court 
erred by relying on the valuation of a company that was valued a year before trial. Ibid., 713 
P.2d 695, 697-698 (Utah, 1985). Berger determined that, as a result of the party's failure to 
evidence valuation of the company at the time of trial, the trial court was left with no 
admissible evidence as to the value of the company at the time of the divorce decree. Id. 
Hence, Berger determined to remand the matter back to the trial court for a new trial to 
determine the company's value at the time of the divorce decree. Id. at 698. 
Guenther ignores the basic tenets of Veronica's argument, which is that a trial court 
cannot affix a valuation date if it is too remote in time to accurately reflect the actual value of 
the property. The trial court was provided with evidence concerning the valuation of 
property in the marital estate; however, the trial court's error lies in the remoteness in time to 
which it affixed the valuation of the items. See, Sather at 193-194. Due to the remoteness of 
the valuations Guenther submitted to the trial court, the trial court was left with no 
admissible evidence to affix valuation to the property at the date of the decree. See, Berger at 
697-698. Accordingly, Guenther's argument fails. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO VALUE THE MARITAL 
ESTATE AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
In his Brief of Appellee, Guenther challenges a failure to marshal the evidence that the 
trial court abused its discretion in the valuation of the marital property and therefore the trial 
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court should be affirmed on this issue. Brief of Appellee at pp. 23-24. In support of his 
contention, Guenther cites to Parker v. Parker, which held a trial court may value marital 
assets at some other time than the time the divorce decree is entered. Ibid., 2000 UT App. 30, 
996 P.2d 565.3 However, in citing to Parker, Guenther ignores holdings in Parker and other 
caselaw that conflict with his argument. 
This Court has held, "[t]he marital estate, and this includes retirement accounts, 
should be valued as of the time of the divorce decree." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 
(Utah App.,1990), citing Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
However, a trial court's determination to affix a different valuation date must be supported 
by adequate evidence to support a differing equitable division. See, id. Furthermore, this 
Court held as follows: 
It is well settled that the present value, as well as any deferred earnings of 
retirement accounts accrued during the marriage, are marital assets and, 
whenever possible, should be valued as of the time of the divorce and should 
be equitably divided. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah Ct.App.1990); 
Bergerv. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432-33. 
The timing of distribution of these benefits depends on the particular 
circumstances, including whether there is particular animosity between the 
parties favoring an immediate disbursal or whether an immediate distribution 
would create a hardship or penalty. Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079; Motes v. Motes, 
786 P.2d 232 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 'cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Bailey 
v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830, 832 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
3
 This Court should note Guenther's muddled arguments and lack of legal authority throughout the Brief of Appellee. 
According to UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9), "[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." As Appellee, Guenther is bound by UT. R. 
APP. P. 24(a)(9) and has failed to provide this Court with concise and well-thought arguments and relevant legal 
authority for his positions in this appeal. Moreover, Guenther failed to correctly cite to Parker in the Brief of 
Appellee. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 24. 
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Id. at 1319. Therefore, this Court has held, "any deviation from the general rule must be 
supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court's basis for such 
deviation." Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App.,1993) citing Morgan v. 
Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App.1990). Rappleye continued to hold the following: 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of assets in a 
divorce action. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1992); accord Morgan 
v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 562-63 (Utah App.1993) ( Morgan II) . "Determining 
and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court, and this 
Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of 
discretion." Morgan II, 854 P.2d at 563 {quoting Tally v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 
(Utah App.1987)). "In making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad 
latitude, and its judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it exercises 
its discretion in accordance with the standards set by this court." Id. {quoting 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987)). However, there must 
be adequate factual findings to reveal how the court reached its conclusions. 
Tee v. Tee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App.1987); accord Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 
1314,1317 (Utah App.1990). 
Id. at 263. 
In Parker, the trial court valued the marital estate at the time of decree and awarded 
the nine (9) bank accounts to their holders rather than placing a value on the marital portion 
and dividing it equitably. Ibid, at ^|6. Parker held as follows: 
While marital assets are generally valued as of the date of the divorce decree, " 
'where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value or otherwise acted 
obstructively,' the trial court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, value 
a marital asset at some time other than the time the decree is entered," such as 
at separation. Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct.App.1999) {quoting 
Andersen v. Andersen, 151 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah Ct.App.1988)). See Marshall v. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 n. 14 (Utah Ct.App.1996). Here, Mr. Parker 
presented the trial court with evidence tending to show that Ms. Parker had 
dissipated marital assets. The evidence showed that Ms. Parker's regular 
monthly income exceeded her expenses by about $2,000. Yet, in the few 
months following the parties' separation, Ms. Parker wrote checks to herself 
totaling nearly $100,000. This showing necessarily shifted the burden to Ms. 
Parker to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were used for some 
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legitimate marital purpose. Cf Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990) (equal division of pretrial bank balances was improper when 
amount was incorrectly presumed dissipated; evidence of dissipation must first 
be shown, then burden would shift to show otherwise). 
Id. at Hi 3. Therefore, this Court determined Ms. Parker did not justify her actions below 
according to her burden in showing she had not dissipated assets from the bank accounts 
and therefore concluded Mr. Parker was entitled to one-half the sum of the bank accounts 
on the date of the parties' separation. Id. at ^[19. 
In the instant case, Guenther argues Veronica failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court abused its discretion in valuing certain major household items. Brief of Appellee at p. 23. 
However, Guenther's reliance upon Parker does not support Guenther's position that the 
trial court was justified in valuing marital property at a time other than the date of the 
Decree. 
Trial courts are generally bound in valuing a marital estate at the time of the divorce 
decree, indicating that it should be equitably divided. Dunn at 1320. Should a trial court 
determine it would be equitable to value the marital estate at a time other than the date of 
decree, the trial court must support its determination by sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
that explain its basis for deviation. Rappleye at 262. The trial court in this matter did not 
equitably divide the marital estate in this matter. Furthermore, the trial court's determination 
to affix a date of valuation other than the date of decree was not supported by sufficiently 
detailed findings explaining its basis for deviation. Id. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law do not indicate circumstances where a party had dissipated an asset, hidden its value, 
or otherwise acted obstructively for its deviation. Parker at ^[13. The circumstances of this 
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case did not warrant the trial court's determination to value certain property in the marital 
estate at a time other than the date of decree. Therefore, Guenther's reliance upon Parker is 
misplaced and this Court should remand this matter to the trial court. 
VII. VERONICA HAS APPROPRIATELY REQUESTED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
Guenther argues Veronica has failed to adequately brief her request for a review of 
attorney's fees or marshal the evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting 
the amount of fees awarded to her. Brief of Appellee at pp. 24-25. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-3 authorizes a court to award attorneys fees in a divorce 
action, placing the decision "within the trial court's sound discretion." Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker. 2008 UT App 11, f l9 , 176 P.3d 476. An award of fees requires detailed 
findings of fact supporting such determination. See, Connell v. ConnelL 2010 UT App 139, 
^27, 233 P.3d 836. Under UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-3(1), "[t]ypically, the trial court must 
base its fee award on (1) the receiving spouse's financial need, (2) the payor spouse's ability 
to pay, and (3) the reasonableness of the requested fees." Id., citing Oliekan v. Oliekan. 2006 
UT App 405, Tf30, 147 P.3d 464. However, UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-3(2) differentiates 
those cases pertaining to enforcement of orders, with the underlying focus on the party that 
prevailed. This Court has previously applied subsection (2) to situations where an individual 
prevails on appeal by stating that, "[b]ecause wife prevailed on the main issues on appeal in 
divorce action, she was entitled to attorneys fees on appeal .. ." Elman v. Elman. 2002 UT 
App83,45P.3dl76. 
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The standard for attorneys' fees on appeal appears to fall squarely under the theory 
contained in UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-3(2), since such award is based upon whether the 
appeal prevailed rather than the financial needs or reasonableness of fees. Under subsection 
(1), the intent is that a spouse who cannot afford to defend oneself will have their fees paid 
by the spouse who is more appropriately situated to pay for such fees. See, ConnelL supra. 
Under subsection (2), the purpose is to not require the entire amounts sought by a party to 
be eaten up by the attorneys fees and thus become poindess in pursuing, even if they 
maintain a right to do so. Id. "[F]ee awards under subsection (2) serve no equalizing 
function but allow the moving party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to the other 
party's recalcitrance" where "the other party is compelled to bring proceedings against the 
offending party" Id. at [^30 (internal quotations omitted). This is so that "he or she is not 
forced to fritter away in costs and counsel fees the amounts received under the order . . ." Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
Veronica was clearly prejudiced by Guenther's actions in the trial court when analysis 
is made of the varying errors occurring below. Veronica was compelled to bring this appeal 
to enforce her rights either under statute or under the Divorce Agreement, which was 
vigorously opposed by Guenther. While the award of attorneys fees below may have fallen 
squarely under UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-3(1) at that time, revisiting such award may be 
necessary should Veronica prevail on appeal. The trial court's determination to erroneously 
fashion both statutory law and nonexistent provisions of the Divorce Agreement in 
Guenther's favor prejudiced Veronica. She was compelled to enforce her rights in this 
appeal against Guenther's vigorous attempts to foreclose them. 
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Regardless of whether a re-visiting of the award of attorneys fees by the trial court is 
ordered to occur by this Court, Veronica is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal if she 
prevails. Veronica is entitled to appellate attorneys' fees and costs associated with defending 
her statutory rights and/or rights under the Divorce Agreement. See, Burt v. Burt 799 P.2d 
1166, 11~1 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to 
the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that part}' on appeal."). 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court 
reverse the trial court in this matter, remand for further findings consistent with this 
opinion, enter orders for property division where the evidence is uncontrovertcd, and award 
attorney fees and costs on appeal 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2010. 
David S. Pace 
x\ttorney for Appellant 
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